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MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

EFFECTIVZNESS OP ORAi CONTRACTS, WITHIN THE STATUTE OV FAUDS.-

In Morris v. Baron and Co., (House of Lords, 1917), 87 L. J. R. (K. B.)
145, plaintiff and defendant had entered into a contract of sale and plaintiff,
as vendor, had delivered part of the goods agreed upon. Delivery of the
remainder would have been a condition precedent to any recovery by the
plaintiff. This contract, however, was followed by a second one, not in
writing, whereby plaintiff was absolved from delivering the rest of the
goods, but by which he agreed that he would deliver them if the defendant
should so request Thereafter plaintiff brought this action for the "price"
of the goods delivered. The defendant set up, by way of counterclaim,
plaintiff's failure to deliver the rest of the goods as requested under the
second contract. The court held that the second contract, although not in
writing, absolved the plaintiff from having to deliver all the goods under
the first contract, and therefore allowed him to recover for the goods delivered, but that, because it was not in writing, the defendant could not
maintain his counterclaim for breach of it.

NOTE AND COMMENT
In Noble v. Ward, 35 L. J.Ex. 8I, L. R. 2 Ex. 135, the defendant had
contracted to buy goods from the plaintiff and was sued for his refusal to
accept and pay for them. He defended on the ground that this contract had
been rescinded by a later oral one substituted for it. The court held that
because the second agreement did not conform to the requirements of sec. 17
of the statute of frauds it did not have the effect, as a matter of law, of
rescinding the first one. This case was interpreted in Morris v. Baron and
Co. as holding, at most, only that a variation by agreement not in writing
would not be recognized, and that it should have been left to the jury to
say whether the parties intended by their new oral contract to rescind the
prior written one. It was distinguished from the principal one on the
ground that the parties did intend by their second contract to rescind the
first one, and that such rescision would be effective even though not in writing.
There is much conflict in the decisions as to whether a contract within
the Statute of Frauds can be varied by oral agreement as to time of performance and kindred matters. Neppach v. Oregon, etc. R. R. 46 Ore. 374,
7 Ann. Cas. 1035, and cases there collected, (holding that the oral extension
of time will be recognized as valid when it has been acted upon, at least.)
Actual rescission of a contract by oral agreement is effective, even though
the contract itself be one within the Statute. Goman. v. Salisbury, I Vern.
24o; Proctor v. Thompson, 13 Abbott N. C. (N. Y.) 34o. So also, although
the authority is scant, a contract in writing as required by the Statute can be
rescinded by the substitution of an oral contract, if the parties intend to
rescind thereby. Goss v. Lord Nugent, 5 B. and Ad. 58 (dictum) ; Gilbert v.
Hall, i L. J.Ch. i5 (at least in equity); Reed v. McGrew, 5 0. 376; Dearborn v. Cross, 7 Cow. (N. Y.) 48. The court in the principal case evidently
treated the second contract as evidencing an intent to abrogate the original
contract.
The court also distinguished the principal case from Noble v. Ward on
the ground that the statute under which that case was decided declared that
a contract not in conformity with it should not be "allowed to be good,"
while the Sale of Goods Act, which governed Morris v. Baron and Co.,
provided only that it should not "be enforced by action." This at once
raises the question whether there is not an intent behind the Statutes broader
than their literal wording might imply. The preamble of the original Statute might lead one to suppose that its object was to do away with certain
oral contracts, "For prevention of many fraudulent practices which are
commonly endeavored to be upheld by Perjury and Subornation of Perjury." This is the view of the court in King v. Welcome, 5 Gray (Mass.)
41. The action was in quantum meruit for services rendered, and the defense was 'that they were rendered under an oral contract not to be performed within a year, which plaintiff had broken. Although the Massachusetts statute provided only that no action should be brought on such a contract, the court held that, "So far as it concerns the prevention of fraud
and perjury, the same objection lies to the parol contract, whether used for
the support of, or in defense to an action. The gist of the matter is, that,
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in a court of law and upon important interests, the party shall not avail
himself of a contract resting in words only, as to which the memories of
men are so imperfect, and the temptations to fraud and perjury so great."
"Looking at the mere letter of the statute, the suggestion is obvious, that
no action is brought upon this contract. * * * The difference, it is clear,
is not one of principle." Accordingly the use of the oral contract even in defense was denied. So also in Scotten v. Brown, 4 Har. (Del.) 324, it was
said, "The danger in this respect (false testimony) and the necessity of the
rule which the statute prescribes, are equally strong, whether the suit is
directly upon the contract, or the contract is sought to be proved incidentally and by way of defense." Acc., Bernier v. Cabot Mfg. Co., 71 Me. 5o6.
A vendee in possession under an oral contract of sale can not set up the
contract in defense-to an action of ejectment. Zeuske v. Zeuske, 55 Ore. 65,
Ann. Cas. i912A. 557, and cases there collected.
On the other hand, Blackstone's sole comment is that "The statute of
frauds and perjuries (was) a great and necessary security to private property." COmmrNTAZS, Bk. 4, *p.44o. If protection to property was the motivating intent of the Statute and its true justification, the distinction based
on verbiage that is made in Morris v. Baron and Co. is eminently proper.
This is the view, undoubtedly, of most courts. The opinion in Gray v. Gray,
2 J. J. Marshall (Ky). 21, thus expresses it, "The letter of the statute of
frauds does not declare a parol contract for land void, it only refuses to
give a remedy for the enforcement or breach of such a contract; but the
contract itself may for the purpose of defense, be used as a shield to protect the defendant against unconscionable demands, and claims growing out
of the contract." In accord with this doctrine, it is generally held that
in a suit on the common counts a contract may be used in defense, even
though it does not accord with the Statute. Philbrook v. Belknap, 6 Vt.
383; Weber v. Weber, (Ky.), 76 S. W. 507; Laffey v. Kaufman, 134 Cal.
391; McKinney v. Harvie, 28 Minn. 18; Sims v. Hutchins, 8 S. & M. (Miss.)
328; Schechinger v. Gault, 35 Okla. 416, (even though the Statute declares
it "invalid").
This is not usually the rule, however, where the statute says that such a
.contract is "void." Donaldson's Admr. v. Waters' Admr. 3o Ala. 175; Nelson v. Shelby Mfg. Co., 96 Ala. 515; Scott v. Bush, 26 Mich. 418; Lemon
v. Randall, 124 Mich. 687; Salb v. Campbell, 65 Wis. 4o5. Neither is it the
rule when the defendant is himself in default under the contract. In such
cases, however, the inadmissability of the contract is not due to the Statute
but because the defendant's acts have rescinded it. Jackson v. Stearns, 58
Ore. 57; Booker v. Wolf, 195 Ill. 365; Burlingame v. Burlingame, 7 Cow.
(N. Y.) 92; Shute v. Dorr, 5 Wend. 2o4 (on the double ground that it had
been rescinded and that it was "void" under the N. Y. Statute) ; Cf. Jelli-

son v. Jordan, 68 Me. 373 (apparently because of the Statute). In these
cases the recovery is allowed, of course, not for breach by the defendant

of the oral contract, but because of his implied promise arising out of unjust enrichment. Loss sustained by the plaintiff, not resulting in enrichment
of the defendant, can not be recovered. Gazzam v. Simpson, 114 Fed. 7i;

NOTE AND COMMENT
Dowling v. McKcnney, 124 Mass. 478. It seems that contracts which do
not accord with the Statute may nevertheless have an effect in showing the
intent in an escrow. See supra, p. 569 ff. The fact that a contract is unenforceable because not in writing does not prevent its use to show value in
actions of quasi-contract, Murphy v. De Haan, 116 Iowa 61; contra, because "void" by statute, Sutton v. Rowley, 44 Mich. 112; or to show the
amount of rent due, Evans v. Winona Lumber Co., 3o Minn. 515; Steele v.
Anheuser-Busch Assn., 57 Minn. 18; or to show damage resulting from
tort by a third party, Burruss v. Hines, 94 Va. 413; or that a settled claim
had a real basis, Michels v. West, iog Ill. App. 418; or to show reason for
money paid to defendant, Coughlin v. Knowles, 7 Met. (Mass.) 57. It is
unnecessary to cite authority to the effect that parties unconnected with a
contract can not collaterally attack it as "void"' This is true even where
the defendant's liability results only from performance by plaintiff of a contract which could not have been enforced because of the Statute. Beal v.
Brown, 13 Allen (Mass..) 114. In suit for specific performance of a written contract to sell land the defendant was allowed to show that the plaintiff had orally contracted to re-sell the land to him. Frith v. Alliance Investment Co., 49 Can. Sup. Ct. 384, Ann. Cas. 1914 D. 458. It is also very
generally held that the Statute must be affirmatively pleaded as a defense,
since the contract gives a legal right until advantage is taken of the Statute.
Crane v. Powell, 139 N. Y. 379; Citty v. Manufacturing Co., 93 Tenn. 276.
As to the interpretation of the Statute, therefore, a statement from Evans
v. Winona Lumber Co., supra, is applicable. "This rule may not be logical-very likely it is not, as an original proposition; but that it is the rule
J. B. W.
established by the authorities there can be no doubt."

